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The mother and the fetus are damaged every time cocaine
is used by the pregnant woman. Any effect on the mother's
body has a magnified effect on the fetus.
Fetuses exposed to cocaine in the womb have experienced
growth retardation, hypertension, intrauterine strokes, and
genito-urinary abnormalities.' These are only a few of the ef-
fects on a fetus when its mother takes a hit of cocaine.
The pregnant woman also faces serious injury to her own
body when she uses cocaine. Some of these effects are in-
creased heart rate, increased blood pressure, decreased blood
flow to the placenta, placenta abruption and bleeding, and
premature labor.
2
The statistics regarding drug-related births in California
are staggering. Approximately thirty drug exposed infants are
born each month in San Francisco County and up to 180 such
births per month are reported in Los Angeles County.' An
estimated ten percent of all births in the nation involve drugs
and the number is estimated to be as high as twenty percent in
California.4 This translates into an estimated 375,000 new-
borns per year nationwide who are exposed to drugs in utero;
the drug of choice for the mothers of two-thirds of these
375,000 newborns is crack cocaine.5 The cost to the state for
these drug addicted babies ranges from $6,000 to $250,000 per
infant depending on the severity of the addiction.6
1. A. Puentes, M.D., Chart on Maternal/Fetal/Neonatal Effects of Substances
Commonly Abused by Pregnant Women (1990) (available at the Santa Clara
County Health Department, Perinatal Substance Abuse Program).
2. Id.
3. Shaver, Prosecute the Motheis of Addiction, CAL. LAW., Nov. 1989, at 72.
4. Id.
5. Note, The Problem of The Drug Exposed Newborn: A Return to Principled
Intervention, 42 STAN. L. REV. 745, 748 (1990) (authored by Bonnie
Robin-Vergeer).
6. Shaver, Prosecute the Mothers of Addiction, CAL. LAW., Nov. 1989, at 72. In
addition to those statistics mentioned in the text, the article considers the addi-
tional costs of foster care ($1500 per infant) and the costs of special education
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Apart from such immediate costs, the physical effects of
drugs on a newborn are overwhelming in their tragic unfair-
ness. An example of the horrors facing a newborn addicted to
drugs is:
[They] are usually born prematurely and are underweight
and malnourished at birth. Their cry is shrill and pierc-
ing .... They are irritable, twisting, writhing, jerking,
sweating, and sometimes convulsing. They sleep poorly.
They suck their fists frantically, but have a poor swallowing
reflex and suffer from vomiting, diarrhea, dehydration,
and fever .... They often require intravenous fluids, anti-
biotics, respirators, and sedation. 7
What should be done to remedy this situation? Should
drug-taking mothers be penalized? Should the state be allowed
to intrude into the privacy of the mother by monitoring her
conduct during pregnancy? Do fetuses have rights which can
be weighed equally or more heavily than the rights of the
mother? Should the legislature be required to fund drug treat-
ment centers which focus specifically on drug-taking mothers?
The issues raised by these queries will be discussed in this
comment. This comment will also discuss the constitutionally
guaranteed right to privacy that could potentially be curtailed
for pregnant women who use, and abuse, illegal drugs. The
rights of the state, the pregnant woman, and the fetus will be
addressed, as well as their respective importance. It will be
argued that guidelines or regulations must be instituted to
penalize a pregnant woman who takes illegal drugs8 and other-
wise fails to adequately and responsibly provide for her fetus.
Part II of this comment will provide a brief history of fetal
rights as they have been recognized in certain areas of the law;
and rehabilitation for these drug addicted infants. The cost of taking care of these
infants is continuous and long-lasting. It is difficult to put an exact cost on the
care and maintenance of these children but this article speaks of the potential
long term costs as being in the "hundreds of millions of dollars." Id.
7. Shaw, Conditional Peispective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63, 74-75
(1984).
8. The use and abuse of alcohol during pregnancy is another area of great
concern. Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) has been cited as the cause of "growth
retardation, facial anomalies, mental retardation, and assorted congential defects af-
fecting other organs." Id. at 73.
Alcohol abuse by women during pregnancy is a major nationwide problem.
However, this comment will focus on the use and abuse of illegal drugs only.
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namely tort, criminal, property and inheritance law. A discus-
sion of the development of the competing constitutional rights
of the state, the woman and the fetus will follow. The attempts
of states other than California to regulate prenatal conduct will
also be considered, before focusing on California's approach
towards fetal and other related rights. Part IV will analyze the
history of these rights. Part V will propose that California
adopt a statute that will regulate the conduct of pregnant wom-
en in order to create a more healthy environment for the fe-
tus, while not unduly threatening the rights of the mother. In
addition, this comment will propose that the state legislature
commit sufficient funds to combat the problem of drug addict-
ed newborns.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Rights of the Unborn
Fetal rights have been recognized in certain legal contexts
for several hundred years. At common law, it was proposed
that "an infant en ventre sa mere 9 ... is supposed to be born
for many purposes." ° In property and inheritance, tort and
criminal law, the fetus was accorded some limited protection,
usually focused upon the subsequent birth and continuing life
of the child as a precondition to recovery of damages.11
1. Property and Inheritance Law
The Uniform Probate Code attributes some rights to the
fetus, stating that "relatives of the decedent conceived before
his death but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born
in the lifetime of the decedent."' 2 Due to this provision, a fe-
9. The phrase "en ventre sa mere" is French for "in the mother's womb." I
W. BLACKSTONE, Commentaries *130.
10. Id. (footnote supplied).
11. Note, Unbor Child: Can You Be Protected?, 22 U. RIcH. L. REV. 285, 286
n.
7 (1988) (authored by Heather White). Today, most jurisdictions allow a cause
of action for prenatal injuries. There are four time limits for injuries inflicted
against the fetus. In particular, a fetus which is viable at the time of injury will be
allowed to recover. Some states will look back at any injuries caused since the
time of conception if the child is born alive. Another possibility is to recognize a
wrongful death action for the death of an otherwise viable fetus. Some states
allow an action to be maintained on behalf of a pre-viable fetus if the fetus would
have been able to maintain an action had it lived. Id. at 289 n.9.
12. UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-108 (West 1983).
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tus could easily be included in a person's will, enabling the
fetus to collect whatever benefits the will accorded it upon
birth. The common law also speaks of the possibility of a fetus
"having a legacy, or surrender of a copyhold estate made to
it ... and it is enabled to have an estate limited to its use, and
to take afterwards by such limitation, as if it were then actually
born."1
3
Property and inheritance law focuses on the potential re-
cipient of property rather than the rights of the fetus. Never-
theless, the fetus is considered an individual in property and
inheritance law, thereby enabling the fetus to benefit, provided
it is born alive.'4
2. Tort Law
A fetus' rights under tort law are significant and continue
to expand. Originally, a cause of action by an unborn fetus for
injury caused during pregnancy was regulated by Dietrich v.
Inhabitants of Northampton.5 In Dietrich, a pregnant woman
had a miscarriage after she suffered a fall due to a defect in
the highway. 6 A wrongful death action was brought against
the town by the child's administrator. The court, in the opin-
ion by Justice Holmes, decided that since an "unborn child was
a part of the mother at the time of the injury, any damage to it
which was not too remote to be recovered ... was recoverable
by"' 7 the mother only. In other words, the fetus had no inde-
pendent legal identity while in the mother's womb.
The rule denying recovery for injury to an unborn child
remained intact until 1946, when Bonbrest v. Kotz' 8 was decid-
ed. In Bonbrest, the court allowed the fetus to maintain a cause
of action against the doctors for medical malpractice for "re-
sultant consequences of a detrimental character."' 9 This case
was notable because it established a new precedent allowing a
cause of action against third parties for prenatal injuries.2 ° Ad-
13. 1 W. BtACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *130.
14. Implicit in property and inheritance law is that a fetus cannot inherit
unless it is born alive to receive the benefit.
15. 138 Mass. 14, quoted in 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 17, 52 Am. Rep at 245.
18. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
19. Id. at 139.
20. Id. at 142. Today, the majority of American jurisdictions allow a fetus
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ditionally, the Bonbrest court recognized the inherent and sac-
rosanct right of an individual to the possession and enjoyment
of his life, limbs, and body.
2 1
Some jurisdictions have extended Bonbrest's "born alive"
requirement and have allowed wrongful death claims for still-
born fetuses. For example, in Louisiana a stillborn fetus is al-
lowed a cause of action under the state's wrongful death stat-
ute.22 This shows the expansive trend that tort law has taken
in recent years, but it is not representative of all states. Califor-
nia, in particular, has refused to allow a wrongful death action
based on medical malpractice for a stillborn fetus in Justus v.
Atchison.23  California conceded that, at the time, "25
states .. .recognize[d] a cause of action for the wrongful death
of a fetus."24 Nevertheless, California chose to maintain the
position that a cause of action for prenatal injuries exists only
as long as the child survives the injuries and is born alive. 5
Tort law has been evolving as modern society evolves and
expands. The rights of the fetus have often been recognized in
tort law but under limited situations or with certain conditions
attached.2 6 This attitude has been changing and, presently,
damages may sometimes be awarded for injuries inflicted at
any point during gestation 27 or even prior to conception.
2 8
subsequently born alive to bring a tort claim against a third party for prenatal
injuries. See Rickhoff & Cukjati, Protecting the Fetus fiom Maternal Drug and Alcohol
Abuse: A Proprosal for Texas, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259, 279 (1989).
21. 65 F. Supp. at 142.
22. See generally Danos v. St. Pierre, 383 So. 2d 1019 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
23. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
24. Id. at 569, 565 P.2d at 125, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
25. "It is our view that a fetus is not a 'person' within the meaning of our
wrongful death statute until there has been a live birth." Id. at 580, 565 P.2d at
132-33, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 107-08.
26. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). Viability has often
been the cut-off point to recovering for any prenatal injuries, as evidenced by the
statement "it is but natural justice that a child, if born alive and viable should be
allowed to maintain a cause of action." Id. at 142 (emphasis omitted).
27. See Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (N.J. 1960) (stating "[w]e see no
reason for denying recovery for a prenatal injury because it occurred before the
infant was capable of separate existence").
28. See Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 III. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250
(1979). In this case an infant was allowed to recover for an injury inflicted to the
mother by a blood transfusion given before the child was even conceived. The
defendant had administered incompatible blood to the plaintiff when she was 13
years old causing prenatal damages to her fetus conceived almost ten years later.
1991] 1091
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3. Criminal Law
In the area of criminal liability for injury to a fetus, the
vast majority of jurisdictions follow the Model Penal Code defi-
nition of a human being, which defines a human being for
homicide purposes as "a person who has been born and is
alive." 29 A growing number of jurisdictions, including Califor-
nia, have not followed the Model Penal Code's lead and in-
stead define murder as "the unlawful killing of a human being,
or a fetus, with malice aforethought.""° The California legisla-
ture adopted this definition after the 1970 decision of Keeler v.
Superior Court of Amador County,3 in which the defendant in-
tentionally inflicted injury on a fetus. However, because the
case was decided prior to the revision of the California murder
statute, the conduct was deemed not to constitute murder.
Criminal liability for harm to a fetus is recognized in some
areas of criminal law in some states, but at this time, there is
no consensus on the rights of the fetus to a criminal cause of
action.
4. Summary
A discussion of the development of fetal rights is impor-
tant for several reasons. A fetus is capable of being injured
while in the womb.3 2 Furthermore, parents have an interest in
protecting their expected child from tortious or criminal inter-
ference by third parties. Laws providing for third party liability
29. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(1) (1985).
30. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988).
31. 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970). In this case, a
recently divorced husband intercepted his wife, who was pregnant by another
man, on a mountain road. Angry at her pregnancy, the husband shoved his knee
into her abdomen and hit her, claiming he would "stomp it out of her." Id. at
623, 470 P.2d at 618, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 482. The fetus was stillborn with a frac-
tured head, but the husband was not charged with homicide because he had no
notice that killing an unborn viable fetus was prohibited under the existing mur-
der statute.
32. "During the gestation period, the fetus can be injured by a physical force
inflicted upon a woman or from exposure of the woman to an external teratogen-
ic agent which enters her body and is transmitted to the fetus through the placen-
ta." Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a Woman's Toi Liability for Prenatal
Injuries to her Child Bon Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 325, 359 (1984).
1092 [Vol. 31
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for prenatally-inflicted injury recognize the interests of the
parent and the fetus.
Additionally, the concept of fetal rights is developing to
the point of allowing the fetus to be born free of injury. In the
medical field, the fetus has been recognized as a patient in
certain situations."s As will be discussed, the imposition of
maternal liability for prenatal injury promotes the same inter-
ests served by protecting the fetus from third party tortious or
criminal acts. 4
B. A Woman's Right to Privacy
1. Background
The "right to privacy," propounded and relied upon by
the United States Supreme Court in numerous cases, 35 is not
specifically stated anywhere in the United States Constitution.
Instead, certain constitutional amendments36 have been con-
strued to imply a "penumbra" of individual privacy rights."
33. Ohlendorf-Moffat, Suigety Before Bitth, DISCOVER, Feb. 1991, at 58. This
article describes several procedures used in the medical profession to save babies
who have life-threatening defects. The surgery is performed on the fetus while it
is still in the mother's womb.
34. Rickhoff & Cukjati, Protecting the Fetus fiwrm Maternal Diug and Alcohol
Abuse: A Proposalfor Texas, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259, 283 (1989).
35. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 190 (1973) (fundamental right of priva-
cy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (right of personal privacy); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (the right of privacy which presses for
recognition here is a legitimate one); Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S.
250, 251 (1891) (right of every individual to the possession and control of his
own person).
36. The most commonly used constitutional amendments are:
U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty,
or property ...."
U.S. . CONST. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United
States ... are reserved to the States ....
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV: "No state shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property . ... "
37. Rights that have been commonly recognized under this "penumbra" are
found in Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (sanctity of family
relationship); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right of individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as decision whether to beget a child); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to use contraception in marriage relation-
ship); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race); Pierce v. Society of
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Case law has been instrumental in establishing and expanding
the importance and weight that is attached to these individual
privacy rights.
In 1890, Justices Warren and Brandeis coined the phrase
"right to privacy" in a Harvard University law review article.38
The definition advanced in their article was that the "right to
life has come to mean the right to enjoy life,-the right to be
let alone." 9 The article spoke of how political, social and eco-
nomic changes inevitably require the recognition of new
rights.4" Expansion of individual rights was viewed as normal
and expected.
In 1891, the first in a long line of privacy cases was decid-
ed. In Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford,4 the Supreme Court
recognized the "rights of every individual to the possession
and the control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others."4" The issue in this case was whether
the plaintiff in a civil action for injury was required to submit
to a surgical examination to determine the extent of the injury
sued for.4" The Court held that this right to be left alone is
not absolute, but rather can be qualified by "clear and unques-
tionable authority of law."44
The right to privacy has been expanded and defined in
subsequent United States Supreme Court cases. As far as wom-
en and procreation are concerned, the most important deci-
sion regarding the right to privacy was Roe v. Wade,45 decided
in 1973.
2. Roe v. Wade
The decision in Roe v. Wade was significant in its proposi-
tion that a woman has a substantial amount of control over the
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (liberty of parents to direct the education of their
children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to teach foreign lan-
guages in public schools).
38. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Pivaty, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
39. Id.
40. Id. (stating "[p]olitical, social, and economic changes entail the recognition
of new rights").
41. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
42. Id. at 251.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
1094 [Vol. 31
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regulation of her own pregnancy. Roe involved a pregnant,
unmarried woman who wished to obtain an abortion. 6 She
was unable to acquire a legal abortion in Texas due to a Texas
law that required a finding that her life was threatened by the
continuation of her pregnancy before a legal abortion could be
obtained. 7 Jane Roe alleged an invasion of her personal pri-
vacy as protected by the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and four-
teenth amendments of the United States Constitution.48
The Court decided that the right of privacy is "broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy."4' Importantly, the Court empha-
sized that this right is not absolute. The Court was reluctant to
give credence to an "unlimited right to do with one's body as
one pleases. '"50
Roe separated the pregnancy cycle into trimesters to de-
fine the freedom and limits placed upon a woman in control-
ling her pregnancy. During the first trimester, the abortion
decision is left exclusively to the woman. During the second
trimester, the state is allowed to regulate an abortion if the
health of the mother is in danger. The third trimester is the
point where the state's interest in promoting the potentiality of
human life allows intrusive regulation of the woman's right to
have an abortion." The court felt that this bright line ruling
would give the state and the woman adequate guidelines in
regulating abortion. However, this trimester approach has
been heavily criticized since Roe due to its unfounded medical
focus on specific stages of the pregnancy.5 2
46. Id. at 120.
47. Id. at 117-18 (stating that it is a crime to "'procure an abortion,'
except with respect to an 'abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for
the purpose of saving the life of the mother'" (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE Art.
1191, 1996)).
48. Id. at 120.
49. Id. at 153.
50. Id. at 154 (stating that "it is not clear ... that the claim . . . that one
has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close rela-
tionship to the right of privacy previously articulated").
51. Id. at 164-65.
52. See Justice O'Connor's dissent in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc-
tive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983). Here, Justice O'Connor argued that the Roe
trimester approach "cannot be supported as a legitimate or useful framework for
accommodating the woman's right and the State's interests." Id. at 454. In addi-
tion, she argued that the artificial lines drawn in the trimester approach of Roe
were becoming "blurred" due to technological advances in the medical field. Id. at
1991] 1095
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Despite the criticism, Roe continues to stand for the im-
portance of a woman's right to privacy and to retain her bodily
integrity. The recent United States Supreme Court case of Web-
ster v. Reproductive Health Services,"3 however, criticized the tri-
mester approach used in Roe v. Wade to establish abortion
guidelines.54 Webster upheld a state's right to regulate abor-
tion, thereby substantially reducing the impact of Roe. The
Missouri statute in question openly stated that the legislature
was "concerned with promoting the State's interest in potential
human life rather than in maternal health."" The focus in Web-
ster shifted from Roe's trimester approach and the rigid line im-
posed at viability to one where the "State's interest, if compel-
ling after viability, is equally compelling before viability. " "b
Roe was not overturned,57 but its emphasis on viability was seri-
ously modified and limited by Webster.
C. State Interests in the Fetus
1. Background
The interests of the state, however they may be defined,
are always either directly or indirectly at issue in any individual
privacy case. The state has a legitimate interest in the child and
the potentiality of human life. The state's power to regulate
conduct to advance its interests is best viewed under the sub-
stantive due process analysis or the parens patriae doctrine.
2. Substantive Due Process Analysis
One general and sweeping approach a state can take to
justify imposing regulations is to assert a "compelling state
455.
O'Connor felt that instead an "'unduly burdensome' standard" should be
used throughout the entire pregnancy. The test would be whether an abortion
regulation "'unduly burdens' the fundamental right." Id. at 453 (quoting Belloti v.
Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976)).
53. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
54. Id. at 518 (categorizing the trimester approach as a construction of tile
Constitution that has proved "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice"
(quoting Thornburg v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 795 (1986) (White, J. dissenting))).
55. Id. at 3055.
56. Id. at 3057.
57. Id. at 3058 (stating that "[t]his case therefore affords us no occasion to
revisit the holding of Roe ...and we leave it undisturbed").
1096 [Vol. 31
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interest." There are three requirements that need to be met
when using this type of analysis. First, the state must advance
an important and legitimate interest. Second, any regulation
must be substantially related to the purpose sought to be
achieved. Finally, the regulation adopted must be the least
intrusive means of achieving its specified end.5" In other
words, a state must specifically outline what it is trying to regu-
late, how it will achieve that goal, and how these two goals are
connected. These rather stringent requirements are necessary
to insure that the state does not unfairly and unnecessarily
infringe on the rights of the individual.
3. Parens Patriae Doctrine
Another possible approach that a state can take in assert-
ing its control over fetuses or children is through its parens
patriae power. The concept behind parens patriae is that the
state possesses some "paternalistic power to protect or pro-
mote the welfare of certain individuals . . . who lack the capaci-
ty to act in their own best interests."59
The United States Supreme Court in Prince v. Massachu-
setts," recognized the ability of the state through its parens pa-
triae power to limit "parental freedom and authority in things
affecting the child's welfare."6' The California courts in In re
Phillip B.62 extended the parens patriae doctrine to include the
proposition that the "state has a right, indeed, a duty, to pro-
tect children."'6 3
These cases create an express obligation on behalf of a
state to assume its role as protector of a child's best interests.
A component of the parens patriae power is the duty of the
58. See gene-ally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("[w]here certain
'fundamental rights' are involved the Court has held that regulation limiting these
rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest'"); NAACP v. Alabama,
377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964) ("governmental purpose ... may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protect-
ed freedoms"); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("strict scruti-
ny . . . is essential").
59,. Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene? 23 DUQ. L.
REV. 1, 22 (1984) (quoting Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1199 (1980)).
60. 321 U.S. 158 (1943).
61. Id. at 167.
62. 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979).
63. Id. at 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
10971991]
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state to actively protect a child in need of protection.64 The
parens patriae doctrine can be used by the state to protect the
physical and/or mental health of the child.
D. A New Outlook on the Rights of the Fetus
1. Background
There have been considerable changes in the laws defining
fetal rights in the last thirty years. Some of these changes are
evidenced by the state's right to override a parent's religious
beliefs to allow prenatal medical care,65 to allow a cause of
action for a pre-viable fetus against a third party who negli-
gently injures the mother,66 and to allow a cause of action for
a child relating to prenatal injuries negligently inflicted by a
third party.67 Several states in recent years have gone even
farther and have directly addressed the mother's prenatal con-
duct towards the fetus.6" Recently, an increasing number of
states have been forced to confront the problem of drug ad-
dicted newborns. An overview of such case law and statutes
from various states follows.
64. See Myers, supra note 59, at 23 (stating that "in addition to the authority
to act, the parens pattiae power imposes a positive duty to do so").
65. See genetally Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Authority, 247 Ga.
86, 87, 274 S.E.2d 457, 458 (1981). In this case the mother refused to submit to
a Caesarean section and a transfusion of blood on religious grounds. The court
found it "appropriate to infringe upon the wishes of the mother to the extent it
is necessary to give the child an opportunity to live;" see also Hoener v. Bertinato,
67 N.J. Super. 517, 520, 171 A.2d 140, 144 (1961). Here, the mother refused a
blood transfusion for her fetus on religious grounds. The court focused on the
"unborn child's right to life and health" in requiring the mother to consent to "the
blood transfusions.
66. See Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 III. 2d 348, 354, 367 N.E.2d 1250,
1255 (1977). The Illinois court argued that "there is a right to be born free from
prenatal injuries foreseeably caused by a breach of duty to the child's mother."
67. Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971) (action on
behalf of an eight-year-old child who suffered prenatal brain injuries during the
fourth month of pregnancy due to an automobile accident).
68. Pregnant Diinker Faces Chaige of Child Abuse, San Jose Mercury News, Jan.
22, 1990, at 5A. Two additional states, Florida and Wyoming, have recently ad-
dressed the issue of a woman's prenatal conduct and the possibility of imposing
criminal penalties against the woman. In Wyoming, a pregnant woman who was
under a judge's order to avoid alcohol due to the previous birth of a baby inflict-
ed with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS), was charged with child abuse of her four
month old fetus due to her excessive drinking. Id. In Florida, a woman was found
guilty of delivering cocaine through her umbilical cord to her fetuses during two
of her pregnancies. Id.
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2. Overview of Case Law
In re Male R.,69 decided in 1979, was one of the first at-
tempts by the New York courts to give the fetus more substan-
tial rights. The baby in In re Male R. was born suffering from
drug withdrawal symptoms. His mother had abused barbitu-
rates, cocaine and alcohol during pregnancy, resulting in the
baby's addiction upon birth.7" The court used the New York
Family Court Act, Article X,71 which allows the state to pro-
vide for neglected children by assuming control of the new-
born. The court focused on the language of the statute con-
cerning whether the child was in "imminent danger of becom-
ing impaired."7 2 The court, at this early stage in the develop-
ment of fetal rights, was not comfortable basing its decision
entirely on prenatal maternal conduct, and thus struck a com-
promise by using the neglected child provision.73 In other
words, the court focused on the condition of the child at birth
and the possibility that the child will be abused, rather than
the prenatal conditions that led to the child's current addic-
tion.
Six years later, in In re Danielle Smith, 4 the New York
court found that a mother had neglected her baby, based en-
tirely on the mother's prenatal abuse of alcohol and failure to
seek medical care. 75 In this decision, the court went an addi-
tional step by proposing a legal presumption that would con-
trol future cases:
69. 422 N.Y.S.2d 819, 102 Misc. 2d 1 (1979).
70. Id. at 820, 102 Misc. 2d at 1.
71. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT art. X § 1012(f) (McKinney 1983) (which states:
"'Neglected child' means a child less than eighteen years of age ... (i)whose
physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent
danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his parent ... to
exercise a minimum degree of care").
72. 422 N.Y.S.2d at 822, 102 Misc. 2d at 4 (stating that "[u]nder the terms of
section 1012(f), a finding of neglect can be based on either the actual impairment
of a child's physical condition or the imminent danger of such impairment").
73. Id. at 825, 102 Misc. 2d at 5 ("[i]t is a difficult question whether an
adjudication of neglect can be based, at least in some cases, solely upon the
pre-natal maternal conduct which has caused the actual impairment at birth of a
child's physical condition").
74. 492 N.Y.S.2d 331, 128 Misc. 2d 976 (1985).
75. Id. at 332, 128 Misc. 2d at 977 (stating that the finding was "predicated
solely upon the prenatal conduct of the mother").
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Proof that a person repeatedly misuses a drug or drugs or
alcoholic beverages, to the extent that it has or would
ordinarily have the effect of producing in the user thereof
a substantial state of stupor ... shall be prima facie evi-
dence that a child of or who is the legal responsibility of
such person is a neglected child.76
This court attempted to recognize an interest in potential
life that would extend to the protection of the quality of
life. 7
7
However, in 1988, in In re Fletcher,78 the New York courts
appeared to retreat from their earlier stance. In this case, the
mother used cocaine during her pregnancy, resulting in a posi-
tive toxicology for cocaine in her newborn. The issue in this
case was "whether a mother's prenatal drug use alone can
form the basis for a finding of neglect under section
1012(f)(i)(B) of the Family Court Act. '79 The court held that a
direct connection must be proven between the mother's use of
illegal drugs and the child's safety.8" The court stated that in
custody cases there will not be a presumption that a mother's
admission of cocaine use during pregnancy constitutes neglect
once the child is born."' The court distinguished the circum-
stances of In re Male R. in reaching its decision.8 2
Two years later in In re Stefanel Tyesha C.,8" the court
found the court's arguments in In re Fletcher to be flawed. In In
re Stefanel Tyesha C., the baby was born with a positive toxicolo-
gy for cocaine. The mother admitted using cocaine during the
fifth month of her pregnancy and two days before the birth.84
76. Id. at 334, 128 Misc. 2d at 978.
77. See id. at 335, 128 Misc. 2d 981.
78. 533 N.Y.S.2d 241, 141 Misc. 2d 333 (Fain. Ct. 1988).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 243, 141 Misc.2d at 335.
81. Id. at 244, 141 Misc.2d at 336.
82. See generally 533 N.Y.S.2d 241, 141 Misc.2d 333. The court emphasized
that in In re Male R. there was proof of "regular and excessive drug use before
and after birth." Id. at 242, 141 Misc. 2d at 334. In addition, the drug use in In
r Male R. was in combination with a statutory evidentiary rule as to repeated
misuse of drug§ which created a prima facie case of neglect. The circumstances in
In re Male R. and Matter of Fletcher were viewed as significantly different by the
court so as not to diminish the decision of In re Male R. and to account for any
inconsistencies between the court's decisions. Id.
83. 556 N.Y.S.2d 280 (A.D. 1st Dept. 1990).
84. Id. at 281-82.
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A child neglect proceeding was instituted and the court found
an action for neglect would stand due to the mother's admit-
ted use -of drugs, a positive toxicology at birth and the
mother's failure to enroll in a drug rehabilitation program. 5
The court explained that it was not infringing on a mother's
right to privacy in finding neglect with respect to the fetus.8 6
Instead, the court was concerned with the "protection of the
child who is born when a woman has elected to carry that
child to term and deliver it.""7
Michigan has also shown a trend toward recognizing and
extending the rights of the fetus. Womack v. Buchhorn,8 decid-
ed in 1971, involved an eight year old child who suffered pre-
natal brain injuries from an automobile accident that occurred
during the fourth month of pregnancy.8 9 The petitioner at-
tempted to bring a common law negligence action on behalf of
the surviving child." The Michigan court allowed the cause of
action and also recognized the proposition that "justice re-
quires that ... a child has a legal right to begin life with a
sound mind and body.""'
In contrast, the Illinois courts strongly criticized this
"right" of a child to begin life with a sound mind and body. In
Stallman v. Youngquist, 2 an infant, by its guardian ad litem,
brought an action against its mother and a motorist to recover
for prenatal injuries sustained in an auto accident between the
mother and the motorist." The court felt that holding a
"mother liable for the unintentional infliction of prenatal inju-
ries subjects to State scrutiny all the decisions a woman must
make in attempting to carry a pregnancy to term."9 4 The
court reasoned that the recognition of the right to begin life
with a sound mind and body would make a "pregnant woman
85. Id. at 282.
86. Id. at 285.
87. Id.
88. 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971).
89. Id. at 719, 187 N.W.2d at 219.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 725, 187 N.W.2d at 222, (quoting Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353,
364, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960)).
92. 125 III. 2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 272, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
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the guarantor of the mind and body of her child at birth."95
The Stallman court refused to recognize a legal duty, as op-
posed to a moral duty, "to guarantee the mental and physical
health of another."96
In 1980, In re Baby X97 was decided in Michigan. Baby X
was born suffering from symptoms of drug withdrawal due to
her mother's drug abuse." The Michigan court held that a
"newborn suffering narcotics withdrawal symptoms ... may
properly be considered a neglected child."99 Michigan reiterat-
ed Womack's right to begin life with a sound mind and body
and added that to enforce this right it is "within this best inter-
est to examine all prenatal conduct bearing on that right."'00
Grodin v. Grodin,'0 ' also decided in 1980, involved a
son's allegations of prenatal negligence against his mother. The
mother had taken the prescription drug tetracycline during her
pregnancy which resulted in discolored teeth for her son.'
The court assigned the same liability to the child's mother as
would be accorded to a third person engaging in injurious,
negligent conduct that results in prenatal injuries.' The
rule established in Grodin was that a "child may maintain a
lawsuit against his parent for injury suffered as a result of the
alleged ordinary negligence of the parent."'0 4 The court al-
lowed a cause of action by a son against his mother even
though the woman's use of a legal prescription drug during
pregnancy caused the injury.
Two exceptions were recognized to the general rule estab-
lished in Grodin to curb any criticism that the rule might be
seen as opening the family unit to unnecessary and potentially
damaging lawsuits. 10 5 The more noteworthy of these excep-
95. Id at 271, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
96. Id.
97. 97 Mich. App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980).
98. Id. at 113, 293 N.W.2d at 738.
99. Id. at 115, 293 N.W.2d at 739.
100. Id.
101. 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980).
102. Id. at 397, 301 N.W.2d at 869.
103. Id., 301 N.W.2d at 870 (stating that "[t]he rationale ...adopted by the
Michigan Supreme Court in Womack, refers only to wrongful conduct of
'another'. As a result, the litigating child's mother would bear the same
liability for injurious, negligent conduct as would a third person").
104. Id. (quoting Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 8, 199 N.W.2d 169, 172
(1972)).
105. 102 Mich. App. at 397, 301 N.W.2d at 870. The court stated that "par-
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tions denies a cause of action if the alleged negligent act in-
volves an "exercise of reasonable parental authority.""0 6 The
reasonableness standard that the court followed turned on
"how the utility of the defendant's conduct is viewed in rela-
tion to the magnitude of the risk thereby created."10 7
An Ohio case, in re Ruiz,'0 s involved a heroin-addicted
mother whose baby was born suffering from drug withdraw-
al. 09 The Ohio court found that an "unborn child is entitled
to legal protection when his life has been interfered with by
another.""0 Ohio protects children in their child abuse stat-
utes, "' but the issue remained whether an unborn child was
included under these statutes. The Ohio court cited the New
York case of In re Smith and the Michigan case of In re Baby X,
discussed above, to highlight the developments in fetal rights
and Ohio's acceptance and movement towards these changes.
3. Overview of Legislative Activity
Several states have instituted new "fetal abuse" statutes,
expanded existing child abuse statutes or introduced legisla-
tion on the subject of drug addicted newborns. Bills have been
introduced in Ohio, Georgia, Louisiana and Rhode Island that
would make drug use during pregnancy a felony." 2 The bill
ents must be accorded immunity from litigation which in fact would disrupt family
harmony and unity." Id. (quoting the trial court).
106. Id. at 398, 301 N.W.2d at 870 (quoting Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 8,
199 N.W.2d 169, 173 (1972)). The second exception addresses the situation where
there has been an exercise of reasonable parental discretion in providing food,
clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care. Id.
107. Id. at 398, 301 N.W.2d at 871 (quoting Meyers v. Robb, 82 Mich. App.
549, 554, 267 N.W.2d 450 (1978)).
108. 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 500 N.E.2d 935 (1986).
109. Id. at 32, 500 N.E.2d at 936.
110. Id. at 33, 500 N.E.2d at 937.
111. Id. at 32, 500 N.E.2d at 936. "[Ohio's] Rev. Code Ann. 2919.22(A) pro-
hibits any parent or guardian from creating a 'substantial risk to health or safety
of the child, by violating a duty of care, protection, or support.'" Id. (quoting
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(A) (Anderson 1987)).
This statute is representative of the types of statutes that must be used to
afford a fetus some protection. The statute focuses on the "substantial risk" that
the parent creates through his or her conduct. In addition, the statute speaks of a
"duty of care," which the Ohio court used in In re Ruiz to extend this child abuse
statute to include fetal abuse. 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 33-35, 500 N.E.2d 935, 937-39
(1986) (emphasis added).
112. Don't Punish the Troubled Mothers, Legal Times, May 21, 1990, at 20, 22.
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pending in Ohio, for example, does several things. First, a
woman who uses drugs during pregnancy would be prosecuted
as a felon. If a woman fails to overcome her drug addiction the
bill would mandate forced sterilization. The bill would set up
several alternative sentences other than a prison term, ranging
from tubal ligation to participating in a drug rehabilitation
program."s
Oklahoma," 4  Massachusetts, 115  and Florida" 6  have
statutes which require filing a child abuse report with the ap-
propriate agency whenever a child is born physically depen-
dent upon an addictive drug.
New Jersey's child abuse statute,"' which involves an ap-
plication for care or custody of an endangered child, includes
a provision allowing an application "on behalf of an unborn
child.""'  This statute appears to include not only the child's
condition at birth but allows an unborn fetus the opportunity
to have an application for custody or care filed relating to
maternal prenatal conduct which may adversely affect the fe-
tus.
4. Overview of Prosecutorial Action
In several states district attorneys have attempted to
criminalize maternal conduct that harms the fetus. Some of
these attempts have been more successful than others.
In San Diego, California, Pamela Rae Stewart Monson was
prosecuted in connection with the death of her baby in Sep-
tember 1986.119 Monson smoked marijuana regularly, took
amphetamines and had sexual intercourse despite her doctor's
113. Id.
114. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 846(A) (West 1991). The relevant portion of
this statutes reads, "[e]very physician ... attending the birth of a child who
appears to be a child born in a condition of dependence on a controlled danger-
ous substance shall promptly report the matter." Id.
115. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119 § 51A (West 1990). This general statute
is entitled "Injured children, reports." In addition to regular cases of child abuse
in children under the age of 18, the statute includes those "determined to be physi-
cally dependent upon an addictive drug at birth." Id.
116. FLA. STAT. Ann. § 415.503(9)(a)(2) (West 1990). This statute defines harm
for purposes of the child abuse statutes. This section specifically speaks of
"[physical dependency of a newborn infant upon any drug." Id.
117. N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, ch. 4C, § 11 (West 1981).
118. Id.
119. People v. Stewart, No. M-508097 (San Diego Cty. Ct. Feb 23, 1987).
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express warnings to avoid all three activities throughout the
pregnancy. 2 ° Monson began hemorrhaging the day before
she was to give birth to her son. She waited twelve hours be-
fore seeking medical attention, and engaged in sexual inter-
course and used amphetamines during that time." Her son
died a month later from brain damage. 122
Monson was charged with violating section 270 of the
California Penal Code, which requires parents to furnish cloth-
ing, food, shelter and medical attention to their children.'
23
The judge dismissed the case, ruling that the statute was meant
to apply to fathers who were delinquent in paying child sup-
port and not to drug addicted mothers.'24 This was the first
attempt in California to criminally sanction a woman for her
conduct during pregnancy that resulted in harm to the fetus.
In Florida, in 1989, Jennifer Johnson was charged with a
felony drug charge.2 5 Johnson was subsequently convicted of
delivering drugs to a minor through the umbilical cord.
1 26
This infant was Johnson's third cocaine-addicted baby.
127
Johnson received a sentence of fourteen years probation and
one year in a rehabilitation program. 2  The court found that
a child is a person after birth but not before the umbilical cord
is severed for purposes of the relevant statute.2 9 The court
also found that Johnson chose to use cocaine, chose to become
120. See Moss, Is Ignoring M.D. Criminal?, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1, 1987, at 23; see also
Schachter, Of Drugs and Death: Prosecutos Raise the Ante; Woman Accused of Contrib-
uting to Baby's Demise During Pregnancy, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 1, 1986, at 1, col.
4 (Metro).
121. Moss, Is Ignoping M.D. Criminal? A.B.A. J., Jan. 1, 1987, at 23.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. People v. Pamela Rae Stewart, No. M-508197 (Calif. Criminal Docket,
page 14, Feb. 26, 1987).
125. State v. Johnson, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 16, 1989, at 1, col. 2 (89-890 CFA Cir.
Ct. Seminole Co. 1989).
126. Davidson, Newborn Drug Exposure Conviction a 'Drastic' Fiit, Los Angeles
Times, July 31, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
127. Id.
128. Sherman, Keeping Babies Free From D)ugs, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 16, 1989, at 1,
col. 2. In addition, Jennifer Johnson is required to report any pregnancy to law
enforcement authorities. Id.
129. Davidson, Newborn Drug Exposure Conviction a 'Drastic' Fist, Los Angeles
Times, July 31, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
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pregnant and chose to allow those pregnancies to come to ten .13 0
In Illinois, a prosecutor sought an indictment for man-
slaughter against a mother who abused cocaine late in her
pregnancy, and therefore contributed to the death of her child
two days after birth.' 3 ' Massachusetts prosecutors charged a
woman with vehicular homicide in 1989.112 The woman was
involved in a car accident due to the fact that she was driving
under the influence of alcohol. The accident caused the mis-
carriage of her nine month old fetus.
3 3
E. California's Approach Towards the Rights of the Fetus
1. Background
California has not allowed or created a cause of action for
a fetus whose mother's misconduct results in prenatal injuries
to the fetus. Several attempts have been made in the past few
years to criminalize a mother's actions but nothing definitive
has been done. 34 Nevertheless, several court decisions and
statutes have addressed the concept of "fetal rights" in certain
situations. A discussion of the various results of these legisla-
tive decisions follows.
2. Interests Accorded to a Fetus under California Law
In 1939, the question of what interests an unborn child
possessed was discussed in the California case, Scott v.
McPheeters.15 This case, involving alleged medical malpractice
130. Id.
131. Sherman, Keeping Babies Free of Drugs, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 16, 1989, at 1, col.
1.
132. Fein and Reynolds, Addicts, Their Babies, and Their Liability, Legal Times,
May 21, 1990, at 20.
133. Sherman, Keeping Babies Free of Drugs, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 16, 1989, at 28,
col. 2.
134. The two most notable attempts to create liability against a pregnant
woman have been in San Diego County and Butte County. See supra notes 119-24
and accompanying text; Shaver, supra note 3. Another attempt was made by tile
District Attorney, Michael Ramsey, in Butte County to punish drug-using mothers.
Ramsey has begun to use section 11550 of the California Health and Safety Code
to prosecute "drug mothers." Section 11550 prohibits drug use and allows a jail
sentence if convicted of the misdemeanor. Ramsey has started to use this code
section to initiate criminal sanctions against these women unless the mother agrees
to join a drug treatment or counselling program. See also Shaver, supra note 3.
135. 33 Cal. App. 2d 629 (1939).
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in the baby's delivery,"3 6 focused on section 29 of the Califor-
nia Civil Code, which states, in relevant part, that "[a] child
conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed an existing per-
son, so far as may be necessary for its interests in the event of
its subsequent birth."1
3 7
The court's decision focused on the definition of "inter-
ests" as used in section 29. The California court felt that,
"[c]learly the word is general in its application and includes
both personal and property rights," 3 1 including "anything
that is profitable or beneficial to the child."
39
3. When a Fetus in Entitled to Protection in California
The courts' interpretation of California criminal and civil
codes has resulted in the decision that a fetus is not within the
definition of a person for the purposes of certain statutes. 140
The courts in Reyes v. Superior Court14 ' and In re Steven S.142
decided that the legislature did not intend to include a fetus
within their coverage of a "person" in every statute.
Reyes v. Superior Court involved a woman who was addicted
to and continued to use heroin throughout her pregnancy.14 3
In addition, she failed to heed any of the advice she was given
by her physician relating to the effect of her conduct on her
fetus, 144 resulting in the birth of twin boys who were both ad-
dicted to heroin and suffered withdrawal symptoms upon
birth. 145
The prosecution relied on the child abuse statute, section
273a(1) of the California Penal Code, 146 that addresses the
136. Id.
137. CAL. CIV. CODE § 29 (West 1982).
138. 33 Cal. App. 2d at 631.
139. Id.
140. See generally Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr.
912 (1977); see also In re Steven S., 126 Cal. App. 3d 23, 178 Cal. Rptr. 525
(1981).
141. 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1977).
142. 126 Cal. App. 3d 23, 178 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1981).
143. 75 Cal. App. 3d at 216, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 912-913.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(1) (West 1988) (stating in relevant part, "[a]ny
person who, . . .willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon
unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of
any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of such child to be
1991] 1107
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
situation of willfully causing unjustifiable pain or mental suffer-
ing upon any child. The court analyzed the use of "child" and
"fetus" in past statutory construction, 147 as well as the cur-
rent language of the statute, to reach the conclusion that sec-
tion 273a(1) did not include a fetus in its definition of a
child.
48
The analogous case in the civil context is In re Steven
S.149 The court in this instance was asked to decide whether
an unborn fetus was adjudged a "dependent child" under sec-
tion 300 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code. 150
After analyzing the statutory history in California relating to
children and fetuses,'15  the court decided "that an unborn
fetus is not a person within the meaning of Welfare and Insti-
tutions Code section 300. " 52 The court concluded that
"when the legislature determines to confer legal personality on
unborn fetuses for certain limited purposes, it expresses that
intent in specific and appropriate terms."' 151
4. California's Approach Towards Abused Children
Once a child is born, California adopts a more protective
approach. The California courts appear more willing to allow
injured").
147. 75 Cal. App. 3d at 217, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 913. The analysis of the use of
the word "child" in section 273a(1) of the California Penal Code focused oil other
California statutes that had decided the issue. The court discussed four instances
where an unborn child had 'not been considered a "human being:"
1. An unborn child is not a human being within California Penal Code §
187 for murder and Penal Code § 192 for manslaughter;
2. An unborn child is not a "minor child" in the "failure to provide" stat-
ute (Cal. Penal Code § 270 (West 1988)).
3. An unborn person is not a person under the fourteenth amendment of
the United States Constitution;
4. An unborn child is not a "dependent child" under Aid to Families with
Dependent Children provisions of Title IV of the Social Security Act of 1935.
148. Id. at 217, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 913 (stating "[w]e are persuaded that the
word 'child' as used in Penal Code section 273a(1) was not intended to refer to
an unborn child").
149. 126 Cal. App. 3d 23, 178 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1981).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 28-29, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 527-28. The court analyzed the history of
sections 29 and 377 of the California Civil Code and sections 187, 270 and 273(a)
of the California Penal Code.
152. Id. at 26, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 526.
153. Id. at 29, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 527-28 (emphasis omitted).
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interference into the family unit when the welfare of a living
child is jeopardized.'54
In the context of medical treatment and proper care, Cali-
fornia law has granted the state some control over family deci-
sions. In re Phillip B.'55 involved a twelve year old boy suffer-
ing from a congenital heart defect, whose parents had refused
to consent to cardiac surgery. 156 The appellate court, while
recognizing the importance of parental autonomy,'57 stressed
the state's power to intervene to protect the welfare of the
child. 15  The court went even further to recognize that
"[o]ne of the most basic values protected by the state is the
sanctity of human life."
159
The court was reluctant, however, to freely allow state
intervention into the family unit under any and all circum-
stances. Instead, the court outlined four specific factors that
should be examined when determining whether the state could
intervene to order medical treatment for the child: (1) "the
seriousness of the harm that the child is suffering"; (2) "the
evaluation for the treatment by the medical profession"; (3)
the risks involved in medically treating the child; and, (4) "the
expressed preferences of the child." 60  The court also
stressed the importance of the child's interests and whether his
best interests would be served by ordering the medical treatment. 6'
People v. Pointer,62 which involved a mother who had im-
posed a macrobiotic diet on her two children despite the re-
154. See San Jose Mercury News, Dec. 10, 1989 at B7, col. 4. A young mother
was charged with child endangerment when she left PCP joints within the reach
of her baby and young child. The children were taken into protective custody
while the mother and father awaited trial.
It is difficult to understand why the ingestion of drugs through the placen-
ta is less onerous than ingestion of drugs through the mouth. The result in both
situations is the same and could even be worse for the fetus because a fetus'
stomach cannot be pumped.
155. 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979).
156. Id. at 799-800, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
157. Id. at 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 50 (stating "[i]t is fundamental that parental
autonomy is constitutionally protected").
158. IM. at 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51 (stating "[u]nder the doctrine of parens
patriae, the state has a right, indeed, a duty to protect children").
159. Id.
160. Id. at 802, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
161. Id. (stating "[o]f course, the underlying consideration is the child's welfare
and whether his best interests will be served .... ")
162. 151 Cal. App. 3d 1128, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1984).
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peated warnings of her physician regarding the health of the
children, 6 ' is important in two respects. First, the mother
was found guilty of child endangerment under section 273a(1)
of the California Penal Code.'64 Second, the trial court at-
tempted to impose a condition of probation on the mother
that she not conceive during her probationary period.'65 This
provision was struck down as unconstitutional, 66 but it re-
mains a novel attempt by a judge to remedy a problem before
irreparable damage resulted to a new child. 16
7
California abolished the doctrine of parental tort immuni-
ty in Gibson v. Gibson6 ' by allowing a minor child to main-
tain an action for negligence against one of his parents. The
minor son brought an action against his father alleging negli-
gence for injuries he suffered as a result of his father's con-
duct.'69 In deciding the issue, the court in Gibson proposed
two important principles: (1) the "interest of the child in free-
dom from personal injury"' 70 and (2) that parental discretion
does "not include the right willfully to inflict personal injuries
beyond the limits of reasonable parental discipline."'171 The
recognition of these two principles resulted in the court's
163. Id. at 1131-32, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
164. Id. at 1133, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1141, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 366 (deciding that "the condition of proba-
tion prohibiting conception is overbroad, as less restrictive alternatives are avail-
able that would feasibly provide the protections the trial court properly believed
necessary").
167. See Churchville, D.C. Judge Jails Woman as Protection for Fetus; Convicted
Thief Allegedly Uses Cocaine, Wash. Post, July 23, 1988, at Al, col. 5 (reporting on
a judge in the District of Columbia who sentenced a woman to jail until the date
her baby was due because of test results showing a high level of cocaine in her
system. The woman was before the judge on a charge of forging $700 worth of
checks. This offense would have ordinarily been punished by probation. Instead,
the judge put the woman in jail for twelve weeks, until shortly before the birth of
her baby.)
168. 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
169. In Gibson, the father instructed his son to go out on the roadway and
correct the position of the tires on the jeep he was towing. The son was injured
by another vehicle while undertaking this act. Id. at 916, 479 P.2d at 649, 92 Cal.
Rptr. at 289.
170. Id. at 920, 479 P.2d at 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
171. Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
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adoption of the "reasonable parent standard" of conduct 72
and the abolition of parental tort immunity. 173
From the above examples, it is apparent that the Califor-
nia courts and legislature are more apt to recognize a living
child's rights. The decision in Gibson demonstrates how the
court "refused to accept the notion that in certain or all areas
of child rearing, a parent could act in any manner and then
hide behind the defense of parental immunity. "174 However,
California remains reluctant to extend those rights to the fetus.
5. California's Uncertainty With Fetal Rights
Several recent California cases have involved babies born
addicted to illegal drugs and subsequent attempts to state a
cause of action for neglect against the mother. In In re Troy
D.,175 the child was born with a detrimental condition caused
by the mother's ingesting dangerous drugs while pregnant.1 76
The court found that the prenatal use of dangerous drugs by a
mother was probative of future child neglect. 77
In 1990, the court of appeal decided In re Stephen W.,178
a case in which the child was born addicted to heroin. 179 The
mother, a heroin addict with a long history of drug abuse,
took heroin the day before delivery. 180 Again, the court de-
termined that prenatal drug use was probative of future child
neglect.' California courts therefore appear ready to accept
the proposition that prenatal substance abuse that results in
injury to the child determines, to some extent, the future harm
that a child might receive. However, California is still not com-
fortable with extending a finding of child neglect to the gesta-
tion period.
172. Id. (stating "we think the proper test of a parent's conduct is this: what
would an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent have done in similar circum-
stances?").
173. See id at 922, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
174. Beal, Can I Sue Mommy? An Analysis of a Woman's To? Liability for Prena-
tal Injuries to her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 325, 353 (1984) (foot-
note omitted).
175. 215 Cal. App. 3d 889, 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1989).
176. Id. at 897, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
177. Id. at 899, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
178. 221 Cal. App. 3d 629, 271 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1990).
179. Id. at 634, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 639, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
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6. Attempts at Fetal Protection in California
District attorneys and senators have tried to institute pro-
grams to curb the incidence of drug addicted babies. In 1988,
Butte County District Attorney, Michael Ramsey, announced a
plan to use "evidence of illegal substances in newborns as evi-
dence to charge their mothers with violating state criminal law
forbidding the use of controlled substances."' The goal of
the program is to "protect children by sending a strong mes-
sage to pregnant women that they should stop using illegal
drugs."1 3 The punishment under the plan would be to enter
a drug rehabilitation program or face a minimum ninety-day
mandatory sentence upon conviction." 4
Additionally, then-Senator Pete Wilson (R. - Calif.) intro-
duced the Child Abuse During Pregnancy Prevention Act into
the United States Senate in 1989.185 The bill would create
five $10 million grants, disbursed to states meeting certain
criteria, to establish programs for the prevention of illegal
drug use and alcohol abuse during pregnancy.8 6 The criteria
determining eligibility for these grants include:
1. Offering a comprehensive approach for the prevention
of illegal drug use by pregnant mothers, including preventive
outreach programs, education and treatment;
2. Providing mandatory rehabilitation to substance-abusing
mothers who give birth to a baby who is addicted or otherwise
injured or impaired by the mother's substance abuse during
pregnancy;
3. Conditioning probation on abstinence from substance
abuse and from association with known drug users, and offer
to mothers who successfully complete probation the opportuni-
ty to have their records expunged;
4. Providing mothers undergoing mandatory rehabilitation
the opportunity to keep her baby with her if the mother is
competent to function in a maternal capacity.1
8 7









F. Criticisms of Legal Intervention
1. Overview
There are a number of possible criminal punishments for
mothers who abuse illegal drugs during pregnancy. However,
there are four main criticisms to the use of criminal punish-
ment: (1) the threat of criminal prosecution drives mothers
away from prenatal care; (2) the inadequacy of treatment pro-
grams; (3) the potential for discrimination in prosecution; and
(4) the invasion of privacy into a woman's right to bodily integ-
rity.
2. Driving Mothers Away From Prenatal Care
For a variety of reasons, many pregnant women in the
United States are unable to seek medical attention. For drug
addicted pregnant women, there is a "lack of available or ac-
cessible medical services,"' 88 resulting in inadequate prenatal
care and education of poor and/or drug addicted pregnant
women.
In addition, 37 million people in the United States are
without health insurance. Of these, 26% are women and chil-
dren.189 This creates a dilemma because some pregnant
women are unable to afford much-needed medical treatment.
The inability to control the pregnancy for financial reasons
may also extend to women, including drug addicted women,
being unable to procure abortions. They are, therefore, re-
quired to carry the baby to term without adequate resources to
ensure prenatal medical care.
If doctors are required to report drug use by pregnant
women, the women who have a chance to obtain medical help
will most likely avoid prenatal care. 9 The doctors would be
seen not as ones to confide in, but instead as another form of
police. Requiring doctors to report drug-using pregnant wom-
en would undermine the doctor-patient relationship:' 9 1 pa-
188. Gallagher, Prenatal v. Parental Rights: What a Difference an "A" Makes, 21
ST. MARY'S L. J. 301, 307 (1989).
189. Id.
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tients would be less likely to confess their problem and request
help if that confession resulted in criminal liability.
In addition, substance-abusing mothers who already have
children might avoid prenatal care if they think that discovery
of their addiction would result in their own children being
taken away from them.'92 If the women know that their ad-
diction is harming their fetus, but are unable to overcome the
addiction themselves, they will avoid the prenatal care and
possible criminal punishment. Medical care becomes an option
that is viewed by these women as resulting in worse immediate
consequences for themselves and their families.
3. Inadequate Drug Treatment Programs Presently in Place
A study revealed that of the drug treatment programs in
New York City, 54% excluded pregnant women and 67%
would not take women whose medical bills were paid by Med-
icaid. 93 In Michigan, twelve drug treatment programs accept-
ed women but only one provided child care. Most programs
did not accept pregnant women.1
4
Requiring drug addicted pregnant women to attend treat-
ment programs has been ineffective due to the unavailability of
the programs and their inability to meet the needs of pregnant
women. Even if a woman secures a place in a program, the
program may be unable to adequately provide for pregnant
women (e.g., no child care, insufficient knowledge of the differ-
ent medical needs of pregnant women, the possible drug with-
drawal of the fetus, etc.).
4. The Potential for Discrimination
Reports indicate that "most women prosecuted for using
illegal drugs while pregnant have been poor members of racial
minorities,... even though drug use in pregnancy is equally
prevalent in white middle-class women.' 9.5 A reason offered
to explain this lopsided prosecution is that poor women are
more likely to go to public hospitals for their care, and public
192. Id.






hospitals are more likely to run drug tests than private hospi-
tals.' 96 In addition, public hospitals have been allowed to test
a newborn if drug related symptoms are suspected, without the
consent of the parents. 19
Even though research shows fairly equal rates of drug use
among white and minority women who are pregnant, there is a
perception that minority women are more likely to be drug
users. The practical result of this misperception is that minori-
ty women are immediately suspect and tested for drugs more
often than their white counterparts. 9 ' The American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) has found that 80% of the women
prosecuted for drug use while pregnant are black, Hispanic or
a member of some other minority.' 0 Other research has
found that 15% of white and black women use drugs but that
black women are ten times more likely to be reported than
white women and poor women are more often reported than
middle class women. °°
Part of this discrimination may be attributed to the fact
that there is a difference in preferred drug use among the
races and the classes. Studies show that poor minority women
are more likely to use cocaine, whereas white middle class
women are more likely to use marijuana.2 ' Nevertheless,
poor minority women appear to bear the brunt of the prosecu-
tion.
5. Invasion of Privacy
As discussed previously,20 2 the right to be free from
bodily invasion is protected by several constitutional amend-
ments.03 In addition, a long line of United States Supreme
Court cases have reiterated the importance and sanctity of the
right to privacy.20 4 Under this right, privately conducted ac-







202. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
203. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, amend. XIV, § 1.
204. See supra note 35.
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However, in recognizing privacy rights, the Supreme
Court has not allowed the home to "be made a sanctuary of
crime."0 5 The "limits of the right of privacy are found by
examining societal values and determining which private activi-
ties are traditionally sanctioned and which are proscribed."" 6
Feminists and pro-choice advocates argue that it is "uncon-
stitutional to deprive women of their freedom simply because
they are pregnant."0 7 Some attorneys fear that states will vio-
late a woman's right to privacy by improperly making health
care decisions for women during pregnancy. 20 8
The Supreme Court has stated that there are certain deci-
sions that are entitled to protection from governmental con-
trol. These decisions are those "dealing with matters relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and
child rearing and education." 2 9 Nevertheless, governmental
intrusion into a woman's privacy regarding her body and her
pregnancy can be sanctioned only in compelling cases.2 10
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
As the preceding material illustrates, the issue of prenatal
drug use and misconduct by mothers is producing a genera-
tion of innocent drug addicts who require extensive state inter-
vention in order to lead normal, productive and functional
lives. At present, California laws and educational efforts are
ineffective at preventing permanent damage to fetuses. The
options that have been discussed are criminal prosecution of
the mothers versus programs educating women about the dan-
gers of taking drugs during pregnancy. However, neither meth-
od will combat or permanently change the real problem: addic-
tion to drugs. Preventive measures must be taken now to stop
the abuse of a fetus before the damage is permanently and
irreversibly inflicted.
205. Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
206. Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the UnboiL: Can the State Intervene?, 23 DUQ. L.
REV. 1, 56 (1984).
207. Keeping Baby Safe Fron Mom, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 3, 1988, at 24, col. 2.
208. Id.
209. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 n.26 (1976).




California has the option of proceeding along several dif-
ferent avenues to remedy the problem of maternal, prenatal,
illegal drug use and misconduct.
A. An Extension of Already Existing Fetal Rights
The fetus has been entitled to specific legal rights since
the days of the common law.2 1' In the context of fetal abuse,
tort law and criminal law are the most natural areas of the law
to encompass the injury inflicted upon the innocent fetus.
In various states, a fetus is able to bring an action in a
wrongful death suit and a negligence suit.2 12 Typically these
actions have been allowed against third parties21 3 and in
some limited situations against the mother. The fetus originally
had to be viable before it was allowed a cause of action, but
some states have allowed a cause of action during the gesta-
tional period. 14
More importantly, several states, concerned enough about
the problem of drug addicted and injured fetuses, have tried
to create the necessary means to allow relief.2 15 If a mother
was found to be feeding drugs to her newborn infant or tod-
dler, most courts could easily make a finding of child abuse or
child endangerment. Several states have attempted to extend
this reasoning to fetuses. In essence, these states recognize that
ingestion of drugs during pregnancy is comparable to direct
ingestion by the child outside the womb.
California has been, and continues to be, confronted with
the problem of a fetus that is addicted to drugs because of its
mother's conduct.2 16 However, the California courts have re-
fused to extend current statutes that protect children against
injury or other detrimental conduct. The child abuse statutes
continue to protect abused children and will only allow a cause
211. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of the com-
mon law rights accorded a fetus.
212. See supra note 22, notes 67 and 88-91 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 27-28.
215. See supra notes 74-77 and 83-104 and accompanying text for an in-depth
discussion of the advances several states have made in the area of fetal rights.
216. See supra note 119.
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of action for these damaged children. 17 California does rec-
ognize its authority through the doctrine of parens patriae and
its affirmative obligation to protect endangered children.
218
However, as far as abuse or neglect by a parent is concerned,
that protection is conditional upon a child taking its first
breath outside the mother's womb. 219 Any conduct prior to
that time is off-limits to state scrutiny. Currently, California
recognizes a right to life but it does not extend its protection
to a right to begin life with a sound mind and body as some
states have done.
Overall, the cases decided in California have skirted the
direct issue of fetal rights. The groundwork has been laid in
California for an extension of the law to the fetus through the
interests accorded to a fetus by section 29 of the California
Civil Code 220 and California's willingness to protect the wel-
fare of living children. 22 ' All that is required is for California
to take the extra step to protect an abused fetus. Other state
courts have recognized that a fetus can be protected from
abusive behavior. From this position, courts in other states
have been willing to extend their criminal or civil child abuse
statutes to include harm inflicted upon a fetus.222
The fetus has increasingly been recognized as an entity
that should be afforded some protection. The extent to which
states are willing and able to experiment with expanded rights
is closely connected to the competing interests of the mother
and the state.
217. See the discussion of In re Phillip B. and People v. Pointer, supra notes
155-67 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
219. Justus v. Atchinson, 19 Cal. 3d 564 at 578, 565 P.2d 122, 132, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 107 (1977) (stating "[riecovery is permitted for prenatal injuries by a
child who is born alive").
220. See supra notes 135 and 137-39 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 154 and 159 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., In re Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 500 N.E.2d 935 (1986); In re
Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 11, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980); In re Danielle Smith, 492
N.Y.S.2d 331, 129 Misc. 2d 976, (1985).
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B. The Issue of the Rights and Duties of the Pregnant Woman, the
State and the Fetus
1. The Pregnant Woman
Roe v. Wade 23 is the landmark case for the proposition
that a pregnant woman retains complete autonomy during the
first trimester of her pregnancy to terminate that pregnancy.
Until the last trimester of the pregnancy the woman has a
qualified right to do with her body as she pleases.2 24 This
qualified right essentially consists of a woman's wishes being
given substantial deference by the state unless the state's inter-
est in the mother's health is important enough to justify
overriding the mother's rights.
With the recent Supreme Court decision in Webster,225 a
woman's right to autonomy in her personal decision-making
will more likely be balanced against the equally important in-
terests in fetal health and protecting potential life. The Missou-
ri statute upheld in Webster insisted that "unborn children have
protectable interests in life, health, and well-being." 22 6 This
case marks a trend towards recognizing the importance of fetal
rights and the state's interest in protecting potential life.
The choice of whether to have an abortion involves an
extremely personal decision regarding a woman's right to pro-
create and to control her body. However, the decision to ter-
minate a pregnancy can be separated from the decision to
continue a pregnancy. 227 Once a woman has decided to con-
tinue her pregnancy, the focus moves to the woman's manage-
ment of the pregnancy. This line of reasoning does not disre-
gard the seriousness of an abortion or advocate abortions to
minimize "management" problems during a pregnancy. An as-
sumption that the fetus' right to life is of paramount impor-
tance has to be made.228 Terminating a pregnancy should
223. 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
224. Id.
225. 489 U.S. 1063 (1989).
226. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 489 U.S. 1063 (1989).
227. One commentator has discussed the difference between managing a
pregnancy and the right to procreate, arguing that the "maternal fetal conflicts
that arise in managing a pregnancy do not involve the women's right to procre-
ate, but rather her right to bodily integrity in the course of procreating." Robert-
son, Procreative Libeily and the Control of Conception, 69 VA. L. REV. 405 (1983).
228. Id. A mother has "a duty to avoid acts or omissions that will damage the
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not be viewed as an escape or as a less serious alternative to
abusing a fetus.
An extension of the rights of a fetus does not mean the
end to a woman's right to privacy. A woman will always be free
to procreate. However, the choices and decisions a woman
makes once she chooses to procreate may be more readily
scrutinized. Neither men nor women are allowed to freely
engage in illegal conduct without legal repercussions. Society
cannot forget or ignore that a fetus becomes a child after the
nine month gestational period. When does the limited free-
dom of a woman/mother begin-once the child is outside of
the womb or does it include the nine-month period when the
child is also completely dependent on the mother's body for
its growth?
A woman's right to privacy cannot be so substantial and
overwhelming that she is able to forego all duties to society
and other individuals. Destructive, negligent behavior is not
tolerated between adults or between adults and children. Why
is it then so intrusive to ask a mother to refrain from destruc-
tive, negligent, and illegal behavior towards her fetus?
2. The State's Interest
States have argued repeatedly that they have an interest in
human life and potential human life. The interest in human
life is always present but the disagreement centers around
when the state's interest in potential human life becomes suffi-
cient to overcome a woman's interest.
The state has the authority to regulate the conduct of
individuals and family life in order to achieve a compelling
state interest.2 29 The state is scrutinized when it attempts to
regulate individuals; however, the state is allowed to regulate
individual conduct to some extent. It is undoubtedly an impor-
tant state objective to have healthy, productive individuals who
will benefit, rather than burden, society. The state will be ex-
tremely burdened by drug-addicted babies who will require
fetus and child, just as she has a duty to protect the child's welfare." Id. at 438.
The author further argues that "once the mother decides not to terminate the
pregnancy, the viable fetus acquires rights to have the mother conduct her life in
ways that will not injure it." Id.
229. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
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medical care, foster placement, adoption, and more likely than
not, ongoing care for the mental, educational, and physical
problems resulting from drug addiction.23 0 Economically, the
problem is of overwhelming and compelling interest to the
state, which will inevitably be required to pay the costs of car-
ing for these children now and in the future.
2 31
The state, under the parens patriae doctrine, is expressly
allowed to regulate the conduct of parents towards their chil-
dren so as to insure the child's welfare.23 2 This protection
should be extended to the fetus. A fetus will turn into a child
who is afforded legal protection within the nine-month gesta-
tional period.233 The courts have recognized the interest in
protecting the child's welfare and the nine-month gestational
period is a necessary precursor to the life of the child. The
state could assert its interest in the fetus thereby achieving the
same overall purpose of protecting children by limiting the
freedom and authority of the parent to engage in abusive be-
havior towards his or her child.
3. The Fetus' Interest
234 feu
In several states, the fetus has a right to begin life
with a sound mind and body, a right that has been advanced
regularly in various state courts. Something must be done to
make that right a reality in California. This right should apply
equally to each fetus, including the unfortunate fetus whose
mother acts unreasonably or negligently during the
nine-month gestation period. If the right is not upheld as it
should be, the fatal cycle of drug-abusing mothers expecting to
retain complete freedom during their pregnancy while ignor-
ing the potential human life within them will continue.
An individual has a right to life and the fetus has been
said to have a right to begin life with a sound mind and body,
230. See supra notes 3-6.
231. See supra note 6.
232. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1943).
233. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). "With respect to the State's im-
portant and legitimate interest in potential life, the 'compelling' point is at viabili-
ty." Id. The "compelling" point has been determined as the third (and last) trimes-
ter of a woman's pregnancy. This is the point when the fetus is usually capable of
living outside of the womb, i.e., it is viable.
234. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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but what good are these rights when the life begins with an
extensive drug rehabilitation program?
C. Evolution of the Law Regarding Fetal Rights
As previously discussed, several states have been active in
extending some protection to a child who is damaged due to a
mother's prenatal drug abuse." 5 The legislature and the
courts willingly protect children who are injured after birth
and sometimes when injured in the womb. This protection is
much needed, but the bottom line is that the damage has al-
ready been inflicted. A child is currently afforded a remedy in
most courts for its injuries, but this occurs after the fact.
Some of the states responding to the needs and rights of
the fetus are interpreting their child abuse statutes to extend
coverage to the fetus.2 6 A New York court has also advanced
legal presumptions that will make it easier for these innocent
addicts to collect damages once they are born.3 7 Nonethe-
less, the harm is inflicted and monetary compensation is the
only remedy.
The law in California regarding fetuses and a pregnant
woman's negligent and unreasonable conduct must evolve.
California's drug-related births are now at 20%.28 This flood
of innocent addicts must be stopped and more active measures
taken to decrease the percentage of drug abusing women who
harm their fetuses. A fetus should be given some power to
stop the irreparable damage that is inflicted on it every time its
mother uses illegal drugs.
V. PROPOSAL
California has been presented with the problem of fetal
abuse but, as of yet, has failed to respond. The incidence and
frequency in which drug addicted babies are born is frighten-
ing and must be remedied. This problem is not confined to
235. See supra notes 74-77, notes 83-91, notes 97-104 and note 119 and accom-
panying text.
236. See, e.g., In re Male R., 422 N.Y.S.2d 819, 102 Misc. 2d 1 (1979); In re
Danielle Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331, 128 Misc. 2d 976 (1985); In re Ruiz, 27 Ohio
Misc. 2d 31, 500 N.E.2d 935 (1986).
237. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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poor, uneducated women, but reaches into every social and
economic bracket.
Due to the prevalence and unfortunate consequences re-
sulting from drug abuse during pregnancy, legislation must be
passed that effectively prevents the problem rather than simply
remedies its effects. Courts have focused on taking the child
from the mother once it is born and treating it like an abused
child s.2 " Rather than wait for the injury to be inflicted, the
legislature must construct a statute that will address the prob-
lem at its roots.
A separate statute devoted to fetal abuse is required in
California to combat the problem. Such a statute could read:
Any woman who willfully, intentionally, and knowingly
uses illegal drugs during her pregnancy will be subject to
scrutiny under a reasonableness standard of conduct. The
state will be allowed to examine the utility of the conduct
in relation to the magnitude of the risk thereby created. If
the risk greatly outweighs the utility of a pregnant
woman's conduct the state will be allowed to monitor her
conduct for the remainder of the pregnancy.
The type of monitoring that is envisioned by this statute
would vary depending on the situation. In some circumstances,
it would be appropriate to require the woman to enter a drug
rehabilitation/education program. In more serious cases, the
state should consider funding a home specifically designed to
treat pregnant, drug addicted women for up to the nine-month
term of pregnancy. Such a home would be expensive to run,
but the amount of money that will be spent on caring for drug
addicted babies is also great. It is necessary to spend the time
and money to alleviate problems before they are irreversible
rather than spend the money for the lifetime care required for
a damaged, drug addicted baby.
The California legislature has discussed the problem of
drug addicted babies. 4 ° However, addiction will not disap-
pear on its own or even with the threat of criminal sanctions.
Drug addiction has been recognized by the courts as a medical,
239. See, e.g., In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980) (court
deciding whether sufficient evidence to take temporary custody of the baby); In re
Danielle Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331, 128 Misc. 2d 976 (1985) (court attempting to
afford a baby protection under a state statute).
240. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
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not a criminal problem. Funding for the treatment of these
women and their drug addiction is required if long-term solu-
tions are desired by the state.
There is a fear that recognizing fetal abuse will criminalize
abortion. Two different issues are at stake: one is abortion and
the other is managing the pregnancy. Fetal abuse would focus
on the woman who has decided to carry her fetus to term. As
previously stated, this does not intend to advocate abortion or
turn abortion into an escape route to avoid criminal liability
for abuse.
Education programs should be initiated alongside a statute
that, to some degree, regulates a pregnant woman's conduct.
In addition, mandatory education programs could be required
as part of a rehabilitation program. Billboards, television or
radio advertisements or any other media could be used to alert
women to the dangers of taking drugs while pregnant. In addi-
tion, mandatory education could be required as part of an
extensive rehabilitation program.
Legislation must be enacted that will help these innocent
addicts before they are permanently and irreparably damaged.
The legislature has to allocate funds to provide treatment pro-
grams that will specifically address the needs of drug addicted,
pregnant women. Only then will the flood of drug addicted
babies be curtailed. Eighteen years and nine months of reason-
able standards of parental conduct can make the difference
between a healthy active baby and one who enters the world
frail and sickly and immediately handicapped by drugs.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the incidence of drug related births rises in the United
States, and in California particularly, society will increasingly
be confronted with the need to act. The illegal use of drugs by
itself is enough to put a person in jail. Thus, the illegal use of
drugs during a pregnancy which results in known detrimental
consequences to mother and fetus should be enough to allow
the state to regulate a woman's conduct. Mandatory rehabilita-
tion programs and scrutiny of a mother's illegal conduct are
required.
A valid concern exists that a woman's right to privacy will
be infringed and intruded upon, but there is a point at which
one person cannot willfully damage another without incurring
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legal responsibility. A policy instituted at this stage to combat
addiction and deal effectively with drug-using mothers can
hopefully curb the number of innocent addicts born every day
and begin to prevent this ongoing tragedy of fetal abuse.
This comment has discussed the evolving status of fetal
rights in various areas of criminal, tort, property and inheri-
tance law. These rights, as well as the rights of the mother and
the fetus have a strong basis in the Constitution and case law,
thus affording them considerable weight in the legal system.
The role of other states was discussed in their attempts to
enlarge the protection given a fetus. California can use these
models to help change its laws. Finally, this comment discussed
the status of the law of California with respect to a fetus and
to a child.
An analysis of this material led to the proposal of a statute
for California which would provide some regulation and guide-
lines for women who abuse drugs during their pregnancy or
otherwise intentionally harm their fetus. The statute proposed
utilizing a reasonableness standard of conduct in assessing the
conduct in question and the magnitude of the risk involved in
the conduct.
Until an active role is taken by the California legislature,
including a significant outlay of funds, the problem of drug
addicted babies will remain. If nothing is done, the legislature
will be faced with deciding how they can expect to stop the
rise of drug addicted babies absent more particularized laws
and funding. Money will have to be allocated to help resolve
this problem. The issue now is when that money will be allocat-
ed.
Louise E. Abbis
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